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I. INTRODUCTION
In Mendelsohn v. Meese' the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York upheld the Anti-terrorism Act of
1987.2 The plaintiffs had sought a declaratory judgment that the Anti-
terrorism Act violated their First Amendment rights of free speech and
association. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the Anti-terrorism Act
1. Although originally published at 690 F. Supp. 1226, the case was subsequently
withdrawn and republished at 695 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
2. Title 22, United States Code (Foreign Relations), Chapter 61-Anti-Terrorism
[hereinafter "the Act"].
3. The plaintiffs originally consisted of sixty-five United States citizens and orga-
nizations. All but four of the plaintiffs claimed the Anti-terrorism Act abridged their
"listening" rights under the First Amendment. 695 F. Supp. at 1472. The court dis-
missed their claims on the ground that they lacked sufficient standing. Id. at 1478. Two
of the four remaining plaintiffs, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Victor A. Ajlouny, asserted
that the Anti-terrorism Act forecloses their right to solicit and receive funds from the
Palestine Liberation Organization for the dissemination and exchange of information.
Id. at 1476-77.
The third plaintiff, Nubar Hovsepian, sought to establish, at the request of the
Palestine Liberation Organization, an office within the United States to gather and
disseminate information on the Organization and the Palestine people. Id. at 1477.
Such an office, established at the "behest or direction of" the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization to "further" their "interests" is prohibited by §5202(3) of the Anti-terror-
ism Act.
The fourth plaintiff, Riyad H. Mansour, is the Deputy Permanent Observer of the
Palestine Liberation Organization's Mission to the United Nations, 695 F. Supp. at
1477, and a party to United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F. Supp.
1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), in which the court held that the Anti-terrorism Act does not
apply to the Organization's Mission to the United Nations. 695 F. Supp. at 1471.
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was unconstitutional as a bill of attainder." The court, by narrowly in-
terpreting the Anti-terrorism Act, held that the Act may permissibly
halt the operations of the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO")
in the United States. The court, however, narrowed the application of
the Act by further holding that it did not prohibit the establishment of
a PLO informational office as long as the organization did not supply
any money to, or assume control of, the office within the United
States.5
In so holding, the court followed the teachings of United States v.
O'Brien6 and found the Act to be a valid exercise of the federal govern-
ment's foreign affairs powers.7 By finding a rational basis underlying
the Act and a substantial and important government interest unrelated
to the suppression of speech, the court was able to uphold the Act with
the support of well settled precedent. 8
This note suggests that the holding in Mendelsohn was at once
logical and flawed. While the court properly deferred to the judgment
of the executive and legislative branches on matters of foreign policy
and national security; it refused to fully enforce the restrictions of the
Act and thereby left open an access that Congress clearly intended to
close. That access, the plaintiffs office, would provide the PLO a means
by which it could operate within the United States and reach the audi-
ence it desires.
II. THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 1987
Congress designed the Act to prevent the PLO and its affiliates
from benefiting through operations established within the United
States. 9 The Southern District recognized that the Anti-terrorism Act
4. 695 F. Supp. at 1476.
5. Id. at 1490.
6. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
7. 695 F. Supp. at 1483-84.
8. Id. at 1483-85.
9. 22 U.S.C. §5202 states the prohibitions regarding the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization as follows:
It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the interests of the Palestine
Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of
those, or any agents thereof, on or after [March 21, 1988] - (I) to receive any-
thing of value except informational material from the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation or any of its constituent groups, any successor thereto, or any agents
thereof; or (2) to expend any funds from the Palestine Liberation Organization or
any of its constituent groups, any successor thereto, or any agents thereof; or (3)
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to establish or maintain an
office, headquarters, premises or other facilities or establishments within the juris-
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does not purport to "prohibit, edit or restrain advocacy" on its face;
however, the court also noted that this case implicated important First
Amendment interests by peripherally offending "our profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide-open." 10
The plaintiffs argued that the Anti-terrorism Act is a legislative
encroachment upon executive authority to conduct foreign affairs. The
court, however, found it unnecessary to explore that argument after
finding no case striking down federal legislation as an encroachment of
the executive's authority to conduct foreign affairs.11 The court also
found this argument to be inappropriate in light of the fact that Con-
gress and the president acted together in promulgating the Anti-terror-
ism Act; consequently no interbranch impasse resulted. 2 After consid-
ering evidence of the many terrorist acts committed by the PLO
around the world, as well as the stated intent of Congress, the court
found that for purposes of First Amendment analysis, the passage of
the Anti-terrorism Act was within the constitutional power of Con-
gress. 3 Finally, the court recognized the need for the judicial branch to
defer to the coordinate branches in matters of foreign policy that in-
volve our national interest.'
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Although the plaintiffs were not restrained from speaking out in
favor of the PLO, or from using their own money in doing so, they
alleged that the Act prohibited them from receiving any money from
the Organization and thus burdened their ability to speak. The2Govern-
ment argued, however, that since the plaintiffs would be acting at the
behest of, and receiving money from the PLO, they would be in fact
agents of a foreign entity with no claim of constitutional rights. 5 The
freedoms of speech and association are essential to effective political
advocacy and the court found that the Anti-terrorism Act infringed
upon both interests with regard to the Palestine Liberation
diction of the United States at the behest or direction of, or with funds provided
by the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any suc-
cessor to any of those, or agents thereof.
10. 695 F. Supp. at 1479, quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964).
11. Id. at 1483.
12. Id. at 1484.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1484-1485.
15. Id. at 1480.
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Organization.
The court relied on Goldwater v. Carter" in recognizing the
strength of combined executive and legislative action in the field of for-
eign affairs against the invocation of constitutional rights.17 The court
noted that it "would make no sense to allow American citizens to in-
voke their constitutional rights in an effort to act as official representa-
tives of foreign powers upon which the political branches have placed
limits. Doing so would severely hamper the ability of the political
branches to conduct foreign affairs."1 8 Such a theory, however, only
disposed of the claims of one of the plaintiffs. 19 The other three plain-
tiffs denied acting in any official capacity with respect to the PLO.2"
In analyzing the First Amendment claims, the court refused to ap-
ply the "most exacting scrutiny" used most recently in Boos v. Barry2
but rather applied the somewhat more deferential inquiry of United
States v. O'Brien.22 In Boos, the Supreme Court explained the "most
exacting scrutiny" test as requiring the government to show that "the
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling [government] interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 12 3 The O'Brien standard,
however, requires only an important or substantial governmental inter-
est unrelated to the suppression of speech. 4 The reason for the court's
application of a more relaxed scrutiny lies in the purpose of the Anti-
terrorism Act which does not specifically punish advocacy of the doc-
trines of the PLO.25 The Act is instead aimed at hampering the opera-
16. 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979).
17. 695 F. Supp. at 1480.
18. Id. at 1481.
19. The court barred only Mansour's First Amendment claims because he was the
only plaintiff acting as an official of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Id. at 1481-
82.
20. The court determined that the government's argument that the other three
plaintiffs were agents of the Palestine Liberation Organization did not preclude the
application of the First Amendment to the Anti-terrorism Act, but it would affect the
court's analysis of their First Amendment claims. Id.
21. 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988). "Our cases indicate that as a content-based restric-
tion on political speech in a public forum [the statute] must be subjected to the most
exacting scrutiny." 108 S. Ct. at 1164.
22. 695 F. Supp. at 1482.
23. 108 S. Ct. at 1164, quoting, Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Edu-
cators Association, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Accord Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los
Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 107 S. Ct. 2568, 2571 (1987); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
24. 391 U.S. at 377.
25. 22 U.S.C. §5202.
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tions of the PLO within the United States. According to [Supreme
Court precedent] significant consideration must be given to the fact
that the Anti-terrorism Act is not directed at speech itself.2 6 The court
determined that the Act's "mens rea requirement, that the actor have
the purpose of furthering the interests of the [Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization], does not make it a content based restriction on speech."2 7
Since the Act is not a content- based restriction directed at speech, the
court refused to subject it to the "most exacting" standard of Boos v.
28
The court then turned to the O'Brien29 test and held that the Act
does not violate First Amendment rights and that the Act can permissi-
bly restrict the transfer of funds from the PLO to the plaintiffs. 30 Al-
though the plaintiffs' ability to speak is affected, that effect is merely
incidental and outweighed by the substantial governmental interest in
effectively dealing with a terrorist organization.
The court further held, however, that the Act should not be con-
strued to prohibit the establishment of the proposed informational of-
fice.31 Though one plaintiff averred that he will not be acting as an
official of the PLO, he stated that the organization had requested that
he establish such an office and that he does wish to further their inter-
ests. 2 The court refused to read the Act as prohibiting such action and
found instead that such an interpretation would violate the requirement
that statutory restrictions be no greater than essential.33 This limited
interpretation of the Act was supported, in the court's view, by the leg-
islative history. 4 The court found that the informational office would
26. Statutes that punish "mere advocacy" and forbid "assembly with others
merely to advocate the described type of action ... [fall] within the condemnation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Bradenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449
(1969).
27. 695 F. Supp. at 1482.
28. Id. at 1483.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1486.
33. Id.
34. Id. The court referred to statements made by Senator Grassley concerning the
intent to prohibit a principal agency relationship from forming between the Palestine
Liberation Organization and American citizens. 133 Cong. Rec. S 13,854 (daily ed.
October 8, 1987). Additionally, the court considered statements by Representative Bur-
ton and Senator Bingaman. Rep. Burton's statements concerned the prohibition of paid
agents of the Palestine Liberation Organization operating an official office on United
States soil. 133 Cong. Rec. H 8,790 (daily ed. October 20, 1987). Senator Bingaman's
statements were aimed at defeating the Anti-terrorism Act. 133 Cong. Rec. S 13,852-
1989l
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not violate the provisions of the Anti-terrorism Act as long as the plain-
tiff did not accept funds from, or act in an official capacity with respect
to, the PLO.3"
IV. THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAIM
The plaintiffs also claimed that the Anti-terrorism Act violated the
Constitution's prohibition against bills of attainder. 6 The court
weighed this claim against the purpose underlying the Act:
[It] reflects a sense of outrage entertained by a wide segment of the
American people and their elected officials concerning the crimes of
foreign terrorists. On its face, it is an accusatory document penaliz-
ing PLO employees by closing their offices and effectively terminat-
ing their activities in the United States. Having been effectively sin-
gled out by Congress, they are left without any right of reply or
appeal, without right to confront their accusers or submit evidence
in an adversarial proceeding. They are terrorists by statutory impli-
cation but without the slightest proof of their involvement in terror-
ism. In short, they are subjected to penalties without the panoply of
protective shields vouchsafed even to criminal aliens by the federal
courts in criminal trials."
The court acknowledged that such circumstances present a classic bill
of attainder. 38 This Act, however, involves an exercise of the Govern-
ment's foreign affairs powers" and it was critical that the court recog-
nized the PLO as a foreign entity standing outside the structure of our
constitutional system."'
By specifically exempting the PLO's Observer Mission and its per-
sonnel at the United Nations, the court was able to uphold the Anti-
terrorism Act against both the First Amendment and the Bill of At-
tainder attacks."' As the court concluded, "Congress may force an
13,853 (daily ed. October 8, 1982).
35. 695 F. Supp. at 1486.
36. Id. "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." United States
Constitution, article 1, §9, cl. 3.
37. Id. at 1487-1488.
38. Id. at 1488.
39. Id. at 1489.
40. Id. at 1481, quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330
(1934).
41. Id. at 1476. The court followed its holding in United States v. Palestine Liber-
ation Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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American citizen to choose between the full panoply of protections of-
fered by the Constitution and voluntarily taking on an official role in
the operations of a foreign power." 42
V. ANALYSIS
Mendelsohn clarifies Congress' power to pass laws directed at spe-
cific foreign entities and at the actions of American citizens in support
thereof, and in this sense the Anti-terrorism Act is a unique statute.43
It does, however, present the important issue of the tenuous balance
between the freedoms of American citizens and the necessarily strict
policy of the United States Government in dealing with adverse foreign
entities.
A. The Effect of a Narrow Interpretation of the Anti-terrorism Act
The court stated in its conclusion that the Anti-terrorism Act must
be interpreted narrowly in order for it to survive constitutional scru-
tiny. 44 Certainly, a narrow interpretation avoids the problems of judi-
cial legislation that arise when courts broadly interpret statutes to in-
clude that which Congress may not have intended; it also avoids an
intended congressional reach that would unintentionally do violence to
settled constitutional principles. In this case, however, the narrow inter-
pretation has resulted in potentially contradictory results.
The court properly applied settled First Amendment law in up-
holding the restrictive provisions of the Act. 45 As was noted in Connick
v. Myers,"4 "the explanation for the Constitution's special concern with
threats to the rights of citizens to participate in political affairs is no
mystery.' 7 Indeed, the basis of our democratic form of government is
a strong commitment to the active and vocal involvement of all citizens
in the political affairs of the nation. The gravamen of the instant plain-
tiffs' First Amendment complaint was outlined in Myer v. Grant, in
which the Supreme Court held that government obstruction of the right
to solicit and expend funds for political purposes
42. Id. at 1490.
43. United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F. Supp. at 1460.
44. 695 F. Supp. at 1490.
45. Id. at 1479. Specifically, the court relied on New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U.S. 350 (1977) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), among others, in its
First Amendment analysis.
46. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
47. Id. at 145.
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restricts political expression in two ways: First, it limits the number
of voices who will convey [the] message and the hours that [those
seeking to exercise these rights] can speak and, therefore, limits the
size of the audience they can reach. Second, it . . . limit[s] their
ability to make the matter the focus of a statewide discussion."'
The Meyer court concluded that those facing restrictions must have
alternative means of communication.
The Mendelsohn court recognized this problem and reiterated the
rule of Meyer v. Grant concerning the availability of other means for
disseminating the plaintiffs' information.49 Had the court accepted the
government's argument that all of the plaintiffs were agents of the
PLO, its discussion of the First Amendment difficulties presented by
the Anti-terrorism Act would have been unnecessary in light of the
court's recognition that foreign entities stand outside of our constitu-
tional structure.50 The difficulty arises, however, when the plaintiffs are
American citizens advocating the interests of a foreign entity. The Su-
preme Court stated in Communist Party of the United States v. Sub-
versive Activity Control Board that although
the means for effective resistance against foreign incursion . . .
may not be denied to the national legislature . . . congressional
power in this sphere, as in all spheres, is limited by the First
Amendment. Individual liberties fundamental to American institu-
tions are not to be destroyed under the pretext of preserving those
institutions, even from the gravest external dangers."
"Incursions" must be read in its broadest sense in order to encompass
both physical and vocal activity.
For a free and open society to survive, however, few if any rights
can be absolute and unyielding.5" The government must, of necessity,
48. 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1892 (1988).
49. 695 F. Supp. at 1480. In Meyer v. Grant, the United States Supreme Court
stated that the fact that a statute allows for other means to be employed to "dissemi-
nate their ideas does not take their speech ... outside the bounds of First Amendment
protection" if the statute "restricts access to the most effective, fundamental and per-
haps economic avenue of political discourse, direct one-on-one communication. That it
leaves open more burdensome avenues of communication does not relieve its burden on
First Amendment expression." 108 S. Ct. at 1893.
50. 695 F. Supp. at 1488-1489.
51. 367 U.S. 1, 95-96 (1961).
52. "Speech is not an absolute, above and beyond control by the legislature..
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951).
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be able to engage in conduct that may infringe, incidentally, upon the
rights of some for the protection of all. Otherwise, individuals with ab-
solute and unchecked freedom would be able to destroy the Constitu-
tion while claiming strict adherence to the principles it embodies. Thus,
the Mendelsohn court allowed such incidental effects on the plaintiffs'
free speech and association rights and found authority to do so in
United States v. O'Brien.53 In O'Brien, the Supreme Court opined that
"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in reg-
ulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms. '54 In Mendelsohn, the purpose of preventing a
terrorist organization from benefiting through operations established
within the United States was found to be a sufficiently important gov-
ernmental interest to justify incidental burdens on the plaintiffs' free
speech and association interests. 55 The court remarked that the prohibi-
tions relating to spending and receiving money from the PLO are es-
sential to achieving Congress' goal in enacting the statute.56 Therefore,
the court was justified, if not bound by precedent, in upholding those
provisions of the Anti-terrorist Act.
In DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construc-
tion Trades Council, the Supreme Court stated: "where an otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Con-
gress. ' 57 It was this sentiment, together with the consideration that any
statutory restriction should be as narrowly tailored as possible, that
motivated the Mendelsohn court to allow one of the plaintiffs to estab-
lish the proposed informational office requested of him by the PLO.58
Prohibiting the existence of the office would, in the court's view, pro-
hibit the plaintiff, not the PLO from operating within the United
53. 695 F. Supp. at 1485.
54. 391 U.S. at 376. The O'Brien court further stated that:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial government
interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and, if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
55. 695 F. Supp. at 1485.
56. Id. at 1485-1486.
57. 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1397 (1988).
58. 695 F. Supp. at 1486.
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States." This view, however, may have the undesirable effect of under-
cutting the force of the holding.
The Mendelsohn case is quite different from previous cases dealing
with government infringement on First Amendment interests.60 In Den-
nis v. United States, the Supreme Court was confronted with individu-
als seeking to promote Communism and classified speech as either ad-
vocacy, which is always protected, and incitement which may
permissibly be proscribed if the objective is incitement to violence or
the violent overthrow of the government. 6 Mendelsohn, however, is sig-
nificant in that it raises the issue of a further division of speech, within
the class of advocacy, concerning citizen speech and agent speech. The
Anti-terrorism Act expressly prohibits the establishment of an office or
base by the PLO, "or any of its constituent groups, any successors to
any of those or any agents thereof." 2
By allowing the plaintiff to establish an informational office, the
court created the administrative problem of ensuring that money used
by the plaintiffs is not provided by the PLO. Furthermore, the holding
requires future judicial determinations concerning the status of the
plaintiffs as either American citizens with a personal interest in sup-
porting the PLO or as agents representing the Organization within the
United States. The court should have been wary of starting down such
a path.
The clear intent of the statute was circumvented when the PLO
contacted and motivated the plaintiff, who acknowledged his support
for and desire to further the interests of the PLO, to establish a base
within the United States. Although a specific finding of control was not
made, such a finding is unnecessary in light of these circumstances that
clearly indicate the plaintiff's willingness to subject himself to the di-
rection of the PLO. By such action, the plaintiff had crossed the line
and had indeed become an agent of the PLO. The Mendelsohn court
should have recognized the importance of such a finding. The Supreme
Court stated in Dennis that, "we think it well serves to indicate to those
who would advocate constitutionally prohibited conduct that there is a
59. Id.
60. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
61. In Dennis, the plaintiffs were found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of the
Smith Act which made it unlawful to advocate the overthrowing or destroying of any
government in the United States by force or violence or to conspire or attempt to com-
mit such acts vocally or through written or printed matter. The plaintiffs conspired to
organize the Communist Party of the United States and unsuccessfully challenged the
constitutionality of the Act. 341 U.S. at 496-497.
62. 22 U.S.C. §5202(3).
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line beyond which they may not go." 6 3 Such a line is difficult to draw
but nonetheless necessitated by the implications of allowing foreign
agents to engage in proscribed conduct within the United States. Cer-
tainly, the plaintiff remains free to personally advocate the doctrines of
the PLO; a freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment. As a foreign
agent, however, the plaintiff stands in the shoes of the PLO and should
have been subjected to the provisions of the Act and prohibited from
establishing the office.
The Mendelsohn opinion suggests that although the plaintiff can
effectively subject himself to the direction of the PLO and circumvent
the Anti-terrorism Act with impunity, the plaintiff is not to be consid-
ered an agent of the PLO. In its desire to avoid a finding of agency and
allow the plaintiff to establish the facility, the court ignored the very
important fact that the plaintiff did not seek to establish the facility
independently as an American citizen. Rather, the PLO desired a facil-
ity within the United States and effectively gave the plaintiff his
marching orders by motivating him to open such a facility. By con-
senting to act under such direction, whether formal or implicit, the
plaintiff voluntarily assumed the status of an agent of the PLO and
should have been treated as such for purposes of the Act.
Finally, the office gives the Organization a foothold in the United
States from which it can disseminate its information, gain influence
and thus benefit from its office in the United States. Such a result runs
contrary to the stated purpose of the Anti-terrorism Act.64 Indeed, such
a result may very well be indistinguishable from allowing officials of
the Palestine Liberation Organization to establish and maintain the of-
fice themselves.6"
The court noted that if it were to find that the Act prohibited the
proposed office, it would have to read the Act in the broadest possible
63. 341 U.S. at 516.
64. "Therefore, the Congress determines that the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion and its affiliates are a terrorist organization and a threat to the interests of the
United States, its allies, and to international law and should not benefit from operating
in the United States." 22 U.S.C. §5201(b).
65. The court seemed to place a great deal of weight on the fact that the Plaintiff
[Hovsepian] was not receiving any money from the Palestine Liberation Organization
for the purpose of establishing the proposed office. 695 F. Supp. at 1486. The statute,
however, prohibits the establishment of such an office "at the behest or direction of"
the Palestine Liberation Organization, regardless of whether any funds have been
transferred. Receiving money from the Organization to establish the office, was also
prohibited but was listed as an additional provision indicating that Congress intended
to prohibit both forms of action. 22 U.S.C. §5202(3).
1989]
342 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 13
manner. 6 The clear language of the Act, however, prohibits the estab-
lishment of an office at the behest or direction of the PLO. 7 The court
construed the statements by members of Congress, that the Act would
not prohibit contact with the Palestine Liberation Organization, to
redefine the words "behest" and "direction" as requiring a transfer of
funds.6 8 In so doing, the court gave a different meaning to the Act than
the specific statutory language suggests and found, on the basis of these
isolated statements, an underlying intent of Congress that was inconsis-
tent with the stated intent of the statute.0 9 Since the Act expressly pro-
hibits the establishment of such an office, the judicial branch should be
unwilling to circumvent the statutory language.
B. Treatment of Foreign Entities Under the Constitution
The Mendelsohn court acknowledged that the Anti-terrorism Act,
"would present a classic Bill of Attainder were it not for the fact that,
as we construe it, it is an exercise of Congress' foreign affairs pow-
ers."70 Although originally considered to include only the penalty of
death, the Supreme Court expanded the Bill of Attainder clause to in-
clude any punishment inflicted by the legislature absent a proper
trial. 71 The importance of the Bill of Attainder clause was perhaps best
described by the Supreme Court in United States v. Brown, in which
the court stated that:
the best available evidence, the writings of the architects of our
constitutional system, indicates that the Bill of Attainder Clause
was intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be
outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the sep-
aration of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise
66. 695 F. Supp. at 1486.
67. 22 U.S.C. §5202(3).
68. 695 F. Supp. at 1486.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1488.
71. In Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867), the United States Supreme
Court stated that, "a bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without a judicial trial. If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a bill of
pains and penalties. Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainder include
bills of pains and penalties." 71 U.S. at 323. Also, in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303 (1946), the Supreme Court held that both Cummings and Ex Parte Garland, 71
U.S. 333 (1867), "stand for the proposition that legislative acts, no matter what their
form, that apply either to named individuals or easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of
attainder prohibited by the Constitution." 328 U.S. at 315.
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of the judicial function, or more simply - trial by legislature.72
Clearly, the Anti-terrorism Act, by its prejudicial penalization of those
affiliated with the PLO, violated this very important and viable consti-
tutional doctrine. Nevertheless, the statute survived constitutional scru-
tiny by falling within an exception permitting legislative control over
certain aspects of foreign affairs.
The Act contains several provisions that purport to control the in-
terrelationship between the United States and the PLO in the interna-
tional arena as well as within the United States.7" Certainly, the Men-
delsohn court was justified in deferring to the judgment of the
executive and legislative branches. "The judicial reluctance to become
involved in essentially political foreign relations matters is consistent
with the repeated emphasis, in cases concerning allocation of constitu-
tional powers, on the need for the nation to 'speak with one voice' with
respect to foreign nations." '74 Although the PLO is not a nation, it is a
foreign entity standing in substantially the same position as a foreign
nation and has no legal interest in the enforcement of the Constitution.
The tension surrounding the Mendelsohn case lies in the struggle
between a governmental policy of strong opposition to terrorism and a
domestic tradition based on the freedoms of speech, association, and
the free flow of information. Although special concerns arise because of
the plaintiffs' status as American citizens:
in order to be able to contribute effectively to the evolution and
enforcement of international norms of behavior, the United States
must be able to do more than just talk. It must preserve the flexibil-
ity to exert meaningful pressure against those financial, commercial
or other interests of the foreign state over which the United States
has some control. 5
This tension would be substantially relaxed if, as the government ar-
gued, the plaintiffs were considered agents of the PLO. In such a case,
72. 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
73. Damrosh, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 485 (1987).
Any subject matter that touches a foreign state's interests in the United States,
United States interests in a foreign country, or the interrelationship between the
United States and a foreign state in the broader international community is a
proper subject for action by the federal political branches under the foreign affairs
powers.
Id. at 516.
74. Id. at 517.
75. Id. at 533.
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the fact that the plaintiffs were also American citizens would be of less
relevance and the court would have been faced with a significantly
more formidable task if it wanted to allow the plaintiffs to establish
their proposed office.76 The constitutional protections afforded Ameri-
can citizens are not without limitation or exception. In a world in
which regional activities yield worldwide results, the arm of the govern-
ment responsible for the development and implementation of foreign
policy must be given the necessary freedom to effectively deal with the
unique threat posed by international terrorism. American citizens
should not, and must not, be permitted to use their status as citizens to
protect the very groups that the government seeks to punish.
Thus, the court in allowing the informational office to be estab-
lished impermissibly encroached upon the interests of foreign policy
and national security. As the Supreme Court stated in Chicago and
Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the politi-
cal departments of the government, Executive and Legislative.
They are delicate, complex and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsi-
ble to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are
decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong
in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or
inquiry.77
The Mendelsohn holding may well have frustrated the purpose of the
Anti-terrorism Act by allowing the plaintiffs to provide the Palestine
Liberation Organization a forum through which it can accomplish its
objectives and obtain the benefits, i.e. media access, of operating within
the United States.
The most significant aspect of the court's ruling, however, was its
general affirmation of the Anti-terrorism Act itself. This unique statute
76. As stated in, Damrosh, supra, 73 VA. L. REV. at 556-57:
There is nothing anomalous about taking a more flexible approach to judicial re-
view in cases involving individuals who represent foreign states than in decisions
concerning foreign states as juridical entities .... This does not mean that indi-
vidual foreign representatives could claim all the personal liberties to which citi-
zens, resident aliens, or even other categories of nonimmigrant aliens, are entitled.
To the Contrary, there is no question that foreign state representatives may be
subject to restrictions on their activities that would be impermissible as regards
other individuals.
77. 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
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stands for the proposition that the United States can legitimately place
significant burdens on terrorist organizations that seek to use the free-
doms of the United States to speak to a worldwide audience. As the
Supreme Court stated in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, policies regarding
the conduct of foreign affairs "are so exclusively entrusted to the politi-
cal branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial in-
quiry or interference. ' 78 The court's recognition of this principal in
Mendelsohn significantly eases the tension between the domestic and
foreign policies of the United States and establishes the legitimacy of
legislation, such as the Anti-terrorism Act, as a useful tool capable of
being implemented in other countries as well. A line, however, must of
necessity be drawn beyond which an American citizen is no longer en-
veloped by the protective cloak of the Constitution at its most dynamic,
such as when a citizen willfully takes on the role of a foreign agent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Mendelsohn opinion confirms the authority of the federal gov-
ernment to take appropriate domestic measures, to effectuate important
national security and foreign policy objectives. The need for judicial
deference stems not only from the separation of powers doctrine, but
also from the United States' need to retain credibility in international
relations by appearing to be unified behind one clear set of objectives.
The Mendelsohn holding paves the way for future statutes nar-
rowly tailored to address the harm caused by specific terrorist organi-
zations. It is perfectly just and reasonable for the courts to scrutinize
such statutes because of their unique framing and relation to bills of
attainder. Once a legitimate foreign policy rationale is shown, however,
the courts must adhere to the structure of the United States Govern-
ment - the separation of powers - and the special nature of interna-
tional relations and refrain from assuming an activist position.
As was stated in the introduction to this note, the Mendelsohn
holding was both logical and flawed. The logic in recognizing a govern-
mental interest in preventing terrorism and restraining terrorist organi-
zations that seek to establish surrogates within the United States is
readily apparent. The shortcomings of an opinion that allows an infor-
mational and fund raising arm of a terrorist organization to establish
an office by obtaining the cooperation of American citizens within the
United States are equally significant. Clearly, Congress will, and
should, enact similar group-specific legislation to deal with the domes-
tic derivatives of United States foreign policy. Judicial interpretation of
78. 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952).
1989]
346 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 13
such legislation should be internally consistent and courts must be re-
luctant to impose an interpretation that ignores or contradicts the very
wording of the statute. Although the judiciary has the authority to
strike out portions of the legislation it reviews while leaving the remain-
der intact,7 9 courts should not, without authoritative evidence, redefine
statutory provisions to avoid their full effect.
The problem of international terrorism presents serious legal and
political difficulties both within the United States and throughout the
world. In order to be effective, it is essential that the United States
retain international credibility by following through on its foreign pol-
icy objectives. The United States will most certainly lose its credibility
if it announces its policy against terrorism and strives for the arrest and
incarceration of terrorists abroad, while allowing the same terrorist or-
ganizations to have an agency relationship with support facilities within
the United States. Although the government can not, and must never
be able to, destroy the great American institutions of freedom and po-
litical advocacy under the pretext of saving them, neither can it allow
foreign entities to use American citizens and the liberties they enjoy, to
accomplish substantially the same result.
Daniel C. Costello
79. Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137 (1803).
